

Fiscal policies and financial markets

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
(ISEG/UL-University of Lisbon;
UECE-Research Unit on Complexity and Economics)

2015


1. Fiscal developments
2. Financial markets
3. Sovereign risk
4. Sovereign ratings

Fiscal developments and crisis (1/5)

General government gross debt
(2005-2013, percentage of GDP)




General government net debt
(2005-2013, percentage of GDP)




Source: IMF World Economic Outlook September 2011.

General government budget balance
(2005-2013, percentage of GDP)




General government structural balance
(2005-2013, percentage of GDP)



Source: IMF World Economic Outlook September 2011.

General government budget balance in the euro area countries
(2007, 2011; percentage of GDP)



Source: European Commission's autumn 2011 economic forecast.

Large deficits after the boom years and the crisis

General government budget balance (% of GDP)

	2000	2007	2010	2014		2000	2007	2010	2014
BE	-0,04	-0,05	-3,74	-2,61	MT	-5,72	-2,30	-3,54	-2,72
BG	-0,54	1,16	-3,12	-1,92	NL	1,97	0,18	-5,13	-3,19
CZ	-3,62	-0,74	-4,73	-2,81	AT	-1,68	-0,87	-4,51	-2,05
DK	2,26	4,81	-2,53	-1,26	PL	-3,03	-1,88	-7,89	4,97
DE	1,14	0,24	-4,17	-0,03	PT	-3,27	-3,15	-9,82	-4,04
EE	-0,23	2,39	0,18	-0,36	RO	-4,67	-2,91	-6,79	-2,16
IE	4,88	0,16	-30,61	-4,84	SI	-3,71	-0,05	-5,86	-3,95
EL	-3,73	-6,46	-10,68	-2,20	SK	-12,27	-1,81	-7,66	-3,26
ES	-0,94	1,97	-9,61	-5,78	FI	7,02	5,34	-2,49	-2,52
FR	-1,51	-2,73	-7,06	-4,03	SE	3,59	3,61	0,29	-1,49
HR			-6,36	-5,44	UK	3,53	-2,82	-10,07	-5,25
IT	-0,83	-1,63	-4,47	-2,57	EA-17	-0,11	-0,67	-6,21	-2,57
CY	-2,34	3,50	-5,29	-5,82	EU-28			-6,51	-2,70
LV	-2,79	-0,39	-8,14	-1,01					
LT	-3,20	-1,01	-7,18	-2,29					
LU	5,97	3,68	-0,81	-0,51					
HU	-3,04	-5,14	-4,31	-3,01					

Source: European Commission spring 2014 economic forecast.

Notes: The Irish figure for 2010 includes significant one-off costs, largely related to measures to support the banking sector, which total around 19% of GDP. Excluding one-off costs, the budget balance would have been -13.2% of GDP for Ireland and -6.0% for the euro area.

Increasing government spending (5/5)

General government spending (% of GDP)

	2000	2007	2010	2014		2000	2007	2010	2014
BE	49,04	48,20	52,45	53,94	MT	39,45	41,78	41,59	44,35
BG	41,27	39,19	37,42	38,65	NL	44,17	45,25	51,44	50,36
CZ	41,65	41,05	43,79	42,99	AT	51,78	48,47	52,82	51,76
DK	53,57	50,78	57,53	56,32	PL	41,08	42,18	45,43	41,26
DE	45,10	43,51	47,85	44,64	PT	41,57	44,30	51,47	46,82
EE	36,12	33,98	40,47	38,30	RO	38,56	38,24	40,10	36,07
IE	31,18	36,70	65,49	40,28	SI	46,51	42,28	49,45	49,29
EL	47,12	47,20	51,28	47,98	SK	52,14	34,21	39,95	37,73
ES	39,18	39,15	46,31	43,78	FI	48,34	47,39	55,48	57,83
FR	51,67	52,59	56,54	57,10	SE	55,09	50,93	52,03	52,38
HR			46,90	47,27	UK	36,42	43,29	49,88	45,97
IT	45,78	47,67	50,52	50,55	EA-17	46,16	45,98	51,04	49,39
CY	37,07	41,33	46,17	47,29	EU-28			50,58	48,55
LV	37,61	35,95	43,44	35,71					
LT	39,78	35,31	42,22	34,82					
LU	37,59	36,26	43,52	43,33					
HU	47,72	50,71	49,89	51,26					

Source: European Commission spring 2014 economic forecast.,


Notes: The Irish figure for 2010 includes significant one-off costs, largely related to measures to support the banking sector, which total around 19% of GDP.

Role of financial markets

- Monitor fiscal policies by attaching a price to tradable government obligations
 - distinct from rules-based approach to guide policy makers;
- Outstanding size of government bond markets;
- Annual roll-over needs;
- Continuous trade in secondary market generates real-time pricing of sovereign risk:
 - bond spreads;
 - CDS;
- Rating agencies.

Financial markets (2/6)


Selected indicators on the size of the capital markets (2002 - 2010; trillions of U.S. dollars)




Sources: Bank for International Settlements and International Monetary Fund.
Note: Derivatives market value is the gross market value of OTC traded derivatives.

Financial markets (3/6)


Euro area daily sovereign bond issuance (1 Jan 2008 – 31 Dec 2011; millions of EUR)



Sources: Dealogic DCM Analytics and ECB calculations.



10-year sovereign bond spreads (1 Jan 2008 – 17 Jan 2012; basis points)





Sources: Bloomberg, Thomson Reuters Datastream and ECB calculations.

10-yr sovereign bond spreads (upper chart) and CDS spreads on sovereign 10Y debt (lower chart)

(1 Jan 2008 – 17 Jan 2012; basis points)


Financial markets (5/6)



Sources: Bloomberg and Thomson Reuters Datastream.

Relevant breaks



- From 2007:08 onwards, acknowledged in the literature as the starting of the global credit crunch, first large ECB emergency loan provided to European banks in response to increasing pressures in the interbank market on 9/8/2007.
- From 2009:03 onwards, very substantial upward revisions by the EC of projected debt ratios (spring of 2009): markets were officially aware of the costs of fiscal activism.



Afonso, A., Argyrou, M., Kontonikas, A. (2014). “Pricing sovereign bond risk in the EMU area: an empirical investigation”, *International Journal of Finance and Economics*, 19 (1), 49–56.

- Developed by the IMF (Balakrishnan *et al.*, 2009), an approximation to potential instability of financial markets (updated by Cardarelli, R., Elekdag, S., Lall, S. (2009). “Financial Stress, Downturns, and Recoveries”, IMF WP 09/100).
- 7 indicators in 3 groups, the composite index is constructed as sum of the normalized values.
 1. Bank related stress: Beta of banking sector showing the perception of risk of the banking sector compared to other sectors in the economy, the TED spread (difference between the short-term interbank interest rate and treasury bills rate), and inverted term structure.
 2. Securities related stress: Corporate bond spread, stock market returns, and stock-market volatility.
 3. Exchange rate stress: Exchange rate volatility.

Financial Stress Index - FSI (2/2)



Risks determine spreads in government bond markets

1. Exchange rate risk: unexpected exchange rate changes (ceased for euro area investors).
2. Liquidity risk: ability to carry out transactions without affecting the price.
3. Credit risk: default event.
4. Other factors (e.g., taxes, issuance procedures).

Crucial for bond pricing: quantity of risks and market price of risk taking (global risk aversion).

- Objective: indicator for default risk of sovereign issuer.
- Ratings by major agencies (S&P, Moody's, Fitch) are required quality signal for many investors.
- Main aspects:
 - consistency across countries;
 - medium-term approach: “rating through the cycle”
 - comprehensive assessment of financial strength: macroeconomics, institutions, policies, possible shocks.

Ratings' methodology (e.g. Moody's): condense all information that may affect default risk into one indicator: qualitative decision

- Macroeconomics;
- Institutional development;
- Financial strength;
- Vulnerability to shocks.

Decision making by committee

- Proposal by lead analyst;
- Peer review by sovereign but also non-sovereign experts.

Caveats of ratings


- Few suppliers of global sovereign bond ratings (S&P, Moody's, Fitch);
- Accounting rules give much power to ratings agencies;
- In the past little supervision of ratings agencies;
- Bond issuer pays for rating: conflict of interest;
- Accuracy of sovereign ratings difficult to quantify (lack of observations).

- Currently the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) is exclusively responsible for the registration and supervision of Credit Rating Agencies in the European Union.
- In addition, ESMA also carries out policy work to prepare future legislation, such as regulatory technical standards, and guidelines. This work is undertaken through the CRA technical committee, which has representatives from all the national competent authorities.

Sovereign ratings (4/11)

Characterization of debt and issuer (source: Moody's)		Rating			
		S&P	Moody's	Fitch	Scale
Highest quality		AAA	Aaa	AAA	17
		AA+	Aa1	AA+	16
High quality		AA	Aa2	AA	15
		AA-	Aa3	AA-	14
Strong payment capacity		A+	A1	A+	13
		A	A2	A	12
Adequate payment capacity		A-	A3	A-	11
		BBB+	Baa1	BBB+	10
Likely to fulfil obligations, ongoing uncertainty		BBB	Baa2	BBB	9
		BBB-	Baa3	BBB-	8
High credit risk		BB+	Ba1	BB+	7
		BB	Ba2	BB	6
Very high credit risk		BB-	Ba3	BB-	5
		B+	B1	B+	4
Near default with possibility of recovery		B	B2	B	3
		B-	B3	B-	2
Default		CCC+	Caa1	CCC+	1
		CCC	Caa2	CCC	
		CCC-	Caa3	CCC-	
		CC	Ca	CC	
				C	
		SD	C	DDD	
		D		DD	
				D	

Sovereign ratings of the euro area countries by S&P (1995 – 2012)







Source: Thomson Reuters.


Notes: The euro area countries consist of the EA12 member states excluding Luxembourg. The ratings are end-year observations except for 2012 in the case of which the ratings are equal to those observed on January 16, 2012.

- Bond spreads, CDS rates and sovereign ratings convey information about the sustainability of fiscal policies.
- But exclusive reliance on market signals can be problematic:
 - markets overreact; risks of complacency/panic;
 - market participants have different objectives (e.g. projection horizon);
 - importance of global risk factors – difficult to explain;
 - distorted signals: lack of market liquidity for small countries (including lack of markets for other risks);
 - government reaction to market signals uncertain.
- Market discipline depends on fiscal framework (market access; no-bail out; transparency).

Sovereign ratings (7/11)



Sovereign ratings (8/11)




Sovereign credit rating in the euro area countries (17 May 2012)

Characterization of debt and issuer	Ratings					
	S&P	Countries	Moody's	Countries	Fitch	Countries
Highest quality	AAA	DE, FI, LU, NL	Aaa	AT, DE, FI, FR, LU, NL	AAA	AT, DE, FI, FR, LU, NL
High quality	AA+	AT, BE, FR	Aa1		AA+	ES
	AA	BE	Aa2		AA	BE, SI
	AA-	EE	Aa3	BE	AA-	
Strong payment capacity	A +	SI	A1	EE	A +	EE, MT, SK
	A	CY, SK	A2	CY, SI, SK	A	ES, SI
	A-	MT	A3	ES, IT, MT	A-	IT
Adequate payment capacity	BBB+	ES, IE, IT	Baa1		BBB+	IE
	BBB		Baa2		BBB	
	BBB-		Baa3		BBB-	CY
Likely to fulfil obligations	BB+	CY	Ba1	CY, IE	BB+	PT
	BB	PT	Ba2		BB	
	BB-		Ba3	PT	BB-	
High credit risk	B+		B1		B+	
	B		B2		B	
	B-		B3		B-	GR
Very high credit risk	CCC	GR	Caa1		CCC	
Default			C	GR	C	26

Portugal


3 Aug 2009 – 15 Apr 2011



Note: daily yields from Reuters.

Portugal, sovereign ratings (11/11)


3 Aug 2009 – 15 Apr 2011



	S&P	Moody's	Fitch
15	AA	Aa2	AA
14	AA-	Aa3	AA-
13	A+	A1	A+
12	A	A2	A
11	A-	A3	A-
10	BBB+	Baa1	BBB+
9	BBB	Baa2	BBB
8	BBB-	Ba3	BBB-

Greek government bond yield spreads over German government bond yield (%)

Background (...)




- 1: Greek government presents its stability program.
- 2: 11 February EU summit.
- 3: 16 February Ecofin meeting.
- 4: Greek government announces additional fiscal measures.
- 5: May 2010 EU/IMF financial support programme (€ 110 billion, conditional on strong corrective policy action).

Source: Datastream.

Sovereign and bank CDS spreads (1 Sep 2008 - 11 Mar 2011; basis points)

Background (...)



Sources: Thomson Reuters Datastream and ECB calculations.


Note: For each country, the CDS spreads of the largest banks for which CDS quotes were available were used to calculate the average CDS spread of banks in that country.



“Between 2004 and 2007, Moody’s and S&P issued credit ratings for tens of thousands of U.S. residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS) and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs).”

“Moody’s and S&P provided AAA ratings to tens of thousands of high risk RMBS and CDO securities and then, when those products began to incur losses, issued mass downgrades that shocked the financial markets, hammered the value of the mortgage related securities, and helped trigger the financial crisis.”

in *Wall Street and the Financial Crisis: Anatomy of a Financial Collapse*. Majority and minority staff report, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, US Senate, April 13, 2011.



During a briefing by academics at the London School of Economics on the turmoil on the international markets and the **credit crunch** the Queen asked: (Nov. 2008)



"Why did nobody notice it?"